Elections and Beyond: Navigating India's Security Concerns Amidst Pakistan's Political Turmoil

Pakistan is currently far from ascertaining the political parties that will form its next government and identifying the potential next prime minister.

The recent elections resulted in a split mandate, surrounded by questions about the fairness of the electoral climate, serious manipulation allegations, and extended challenges to the accuracy of vote counts over three days.

Leading with a minimum of 96 seats are candidates associated with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan. These candidates were compelled to contest as independents without their electoral symbol, the cricket bat.

Following closely is the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN), led by three-time ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, securing 75 seats. Theoretically, this makes it the single-largest party in the National Assembly, though representing less than a third of the 266 available seats.

In the third position is the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, securing 54 seats.

Currently, the most popular party in Pakistan is the PTI, led by Imran Khan, who is in jail and barred from contesting.

Similar to Imran's situation, Nawaz faced inquiries and corruption allegations, leading to his resignation from the PM’s post in 2017 and subsequent departure from the country.

The Army has played a pivotal role in both the rise and fall of leaders like Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan. The military's influence has been a significant factor preventing any prime minister from serving a full five-year term, with three coups reinforcing the generals as powerful political players.

Role of Pakistan’s military in the country’s governance

In his book ‘India vs Pakistan: Why Can’t We Just Be Friends?’, former Pakistani diplomat Husain Haqqani highlights the military's disproportionate resources from the outset, with Pakistan inheriting a substantial share of the British Indian Army.

“Pakistan’s share out of Partition comprised 21 per cent of British India’s population and 17 per cent of its revenue… Under the terms of Partition, Pakistan received 30 per cent of British India’s army, 40 per cent of its navy, and 20 per cent of its air force,” he wrote.

The first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, allocated 75% of the first budget in 1948 to defence and to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of the forces. “Thus, Pakistan was not like other countries that raise an army to deal with threats they face; it had inherited a large army that needed a threat if it was to be maintained,” Haqqani wrote.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, did not anticipate military supremacy and emphasized civilian control over national policy. In 1948, in a speech at the Army Staff College, Quetta, Jinnah said: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.”

Pakistan’s military has done the exact opposite. In 2022, former Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa was candid that the military had “unconstitutionally interfered in politics”.

The respected Pakistani newspaper Dawn noted at the time that the “army’s interference in politics has been widespread and has ranged from dislodging civilian governments through coups to indirectly controlling weak dispensations”, and that “political leaders have…quite readily ceded space to the military due to their weaknesses allowing the institutional boundaries to be breached.”

Aqil Shah's analysis points out that the military's mistrust of politicians and its perception of the Indian threat has contributed to its dominance in civil-military relations.

“The Pakistani military had inherited an apolitical professionalism from the British Indian Army… But military officers (and civil servants) had also imbibed the colonial officials’ view of nationalist politicians as untrustworthy, good-for-nothing agitators,” Shah wrote in his book ‘The Army and the Democracy.’

But it was the perceived threat from India that shaped civil-military relations “more than any other factor”, according to Shah. “It spurred the militarization of the Pakistani state in the early years and…provided the context in which the generals could increase their influence in domestic politics and national security policy without leaving the barracks,” he wrote.

“State survival became the primary concern of the rulers of Pakistan, who equated it with an assertive federal government, strong defence posture, high defence expenditure and an emphasis on monolithic nationalism,” Rizvi wrote.

While in India, the Congress successfully transitioned from being at the forefront of the independence movement to playing the role of a popular representative political party, the Muslim League could not do the same.

Leaders after Jinnah (who died in 1948) and Liaquat (who was assassinated in 1951) “did not possess a national stature, lacked imagination and were unable to inspire the people, let alone deal with difficult political and economic problems”, Rizvi wrote.

Elections have been pivotal in shaping the balance of power between civilian governments and the military. Despite the military's interference, the role of the military has evolved over time, with intermittent periods of relinquishing and reasserting power.

The Army assumed control directly on three occasions:

In the FIRST COUP of 1958, much like their counterparts in Asian and Latin American militaries during the Cold War, the Pakistani military leadership believed that centralized authority was crucial for nation-building. This belief stemmed from the notion that centralized authority could facilitate uniform political and economic modernization, thereby preventing venal politicians from exploiting people’s ethnic sentiments, as articulated by Shah.

Consequently, in the midst of an economic and political crisis in 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan set aside the existing government and suspended political activities. The populace, sensing a need for stability, expressed support for the military, thereby legitimizing the takeover.

The SECOND COUP unfolded in 1977, prompted by the national mood darkened by the humiliating defeat by India and the dismemberment of the country in 1971. Allegations of election rigging arose after the results of the 1977 elections, with the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) accusing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

In response, General Zia-ul Haq seized power through a coup after Bhutto imposed martial law. Subsequently, Bhutto was hanged in 1979.

The THIRD COUP occurred in 1999, driven by the apprehension of the consolidation of power under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup, and one of the key points of contention between Musharraf and Nawaz was the former's push to initiate a conflict with India in Kashmir to claim territory.

While India penalized Pakistan for Musharraf’s misadventure in Kargil, the general swiftly deposed the Prime Minister who had appointed him to the post.

Shah wrote: “In a democracy, the military (or other state institutions) cannot be above the rule of law. However, the Pakistani military operates outside the purview of the civilian legal system with impunity because it considers itself above the law…”

The role of the military has evolved over time. “In 2007-2008, the military extricated itself from power in the face of anti-regime protests… Since 2008, the generals have tolerated political democracy because direct military rule has been seen as antithetical to the military’s image and interests,” Shah wrote.

“In almost pendulum-like fashion, it appears the military has gone from governorship back to guardianship,” he said.

In 2018, the military favoured Imran over Nawaz. However, as Imran, enjoying widespread public support, began expressing criticism of the military, he faced numerous accusations, culminating in his arrest on May 9, 2023. Subsequently, his angered supporters launched attacks on more than 20 military installations and state buildings, including the Army headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Presently, Nawaz has once again become the establishment's choice, emphasizing that Pakistan's intricate civil-military relationship will continue to shape its political landscape in the foreseeable future.

From India's standpoint, the elections in Pakistan hinge on the dynamics of power between the civilian government and the military. South Block perceives the change of Army Chief as the genuine transition of power in Pakistan, distinct from democracies where elections lead to peaceful transfers of power.

India views these elections as more predictable than ever, with the military making its preferences explicit, and some describing the proceedings on February 8 as the "mother of all selections."

The key concern for India is Pakistan's persistent support for terrorism, leading to its adoption of a doctrine of indifference as its western neighbour grapples with challenges on various fronts. Nevertheless, the elections present an opportunity for potential changes.

For the first time in years, the election cycles of both countries align. By May, India will have a government with a five-year mandate, while Pakistan's civilian government will be in its early months. General Asim Munir assumed the role of Army Chief in November 2022, and considering his predecessor's six-year tenure, a change of guard at the GHQ in Rawalpindi may take some time.

This alignment provides a potential avenue for both sides to contemplate the longer-term aspects of their complex relationship.